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In this study, the authors investigated whether training participants to use cognitive strategies can aid
forgetting in depression. Participants diagnosed with major depressive disorder (MDD) and neverdepressed participants learned to associate neutral cue words with a positive or negative target word and
were then instructed not to think about the negative targets when shown their cues. The authors compared
3 different conditions: an unaided condition, a positive-substitute condition, and a negative-substitute
condition. In the substitute conditions, participants were instructed to use new targets to keep from
thinking about the original targets. After the training phase, participants were instructed to recall all
targets when presented with the cues. MDD participants, in contrast with control participants, did not
exhibit forgetting of negative words in the unaided condition. In both the negative and positive substitute
conditions, however, MDD participants showed successful forgetting of negative words and a clear
practice effect. In contrast, negative substitute words did not aid forgetting by the control participants.
These findings suggest that training depressed individuals to use cognitive strategies can increase
forgetting of negative words.
Keywords: depression, memory, cognition, emotion, attention

and sustained negative affect (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & NolenHoeksema, 1998). Indeed, the frequent experience of unintentional
and often uncontrollable negative thoughts and memories has been
related to both the maintenance of depressive episodes and the
likelihood of recurrence (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; NolenHoeksema & Larson, 1999; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998). In
this context, therefore, the ability to forget negative material may
play an important role in emotion regulation in general and, more
specifically, may also provide insight into processes that underlie
the onset and maintenance of depressive disorders. The goal of this
study was to investigate whether training depressed participants in
the use of specific cognitive strategies to suppress the retrieval of
negative words could aid their forgetting.
Recent work by Mathews and others provided the first evidence
that cognitive biases play a causal role in maintaining emotional
disorders and that training sessions designed to modify these
biases reduce stress reactivity and state anxiety in high-traitanxious participants (e.g., MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell,
Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). Previous studies, however, have used cognitive bias manipulations to
change attention to valenced stimuli or interpretation of ambiguous
stimuli; these manipulations are more relevant to anxiety disorders
than they are to depression (see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005).
Given the strength of the associations among remembering, rumination, and depression, training depressed participants to suppress
and forget negative material seems a particularly promising approach to the development of effective methods of remediation for
this disorder. Indeed, in contrast with nondepressed persons, depressed individuals typically make little effort to suppress negative
thoughts (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993).

Memories affect emotion regulation in important ways. Investigators have demonstrated that memories of unpleasant events
fade faster than do memories of pleasant events and that this
differential fading is associated with happiness (Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003). Researchers have also found that recalling positive autobiographical memories can repair an induced
negative mood state (Joormann & Siemer, 2004) and that remembering positive events and forgetting negative events is associated
with increased well-being over the lifespan (Charles, Mather, &
Carstensen, 2003). Although the strong association between memory and emotion usually works in our favor, enhanced memory for
traumatic events and the role of biased recall in maintaining
depression demonstrate that it can come at a cost. Preferential
recall of negative compared with positive material is one of the
most robust findings in the depression literature (Matt, Vazquez, &
Campbell, 1992). Recent reviews suggest that depressed people
demonstrate increased elaboration of negative material and tend to
respond to negative life events and mood states with rumination
(e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Rumination makes negative
memories more accessible and more likely to be easily retrieved,
resulting in a vicious circle of rumination, mood-congruent recall,
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SPECIAL SECTION: TRAINING FORGETTING IN DEPRESSION

Recent studies on intentional forgetting suggest that training in
the suppression of unwanted thoughts can have enduring consequences for subsequent recall. In a series of studies, Anderson and
Green (2001) demonstrated that people are able to forget unwanted
material if they actively prevent the retrieval of this material
during a suppression training phase. Anderson and Green’s “think/
no-think” (TNT) procedure requires participants to practice suppressing target words when faced with multiple occurrences of the
cues that they had learned to associate with them. The authors
found that when people consistently prevent memories from entering awareness, the subsequent deliberate recall of suppressed
targets becomes increasingly difficult. Participants in these studies
first learned unrelated word pairs to criterion. In the next phase
(TNT phase), the first members of some pairs were presented as
cues for recalling the second member (respond condition), and the
first members of other pairs served as cues to stop the second
member from coming to mind (suppress condition). Finally, after
a varied number of trials in which participants made responses to
some cues and suppressed responses to others, participants were
asked to recall all targets. Using this TNT design, Anderson and
Green showed that the level of recalling previously suppressed
targets dropped below the baseline recall of targets not cued in the
second phase. Moreover, the greater the number of suppression
trials, the fewer the targets recalled on the final test. Therefore, it
appears that keeping words from coming to mind during the
training phase makes the subsequent recall of these thoughts or
memories more difficult. These findings indicate that suppression
training might be a useful tool to counteract biased recall in
depressive disorders.
Anderson and Green’s (2001) findings of below-baseline forgetting have been replicated (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; Joormann, Hertel, Brozovich, & Gotlib, 2005), although there have
also been both nonreplications (e.g., Bulevich, Roediger, Balota, &
Butler, 2006) and studies with inconsistent findings of belowbaseline suppression (Hertel & Calcaterra, 2005; Hertel & Gerstle,
2003). It is important to note that Hertel and Calcaterra (2005)
provided evidence that final recall is influenced by the use of
strategies during the TNT phase. In their study, Hertel and Calcaterra compared recall following aided and unaided TNT training.
In the aided condition, participants were provided with substitute
words and the instruction to use these substitutes during the TNT
phase to prevent the original target from coming to mind. On the
final recall test, participants in the aided condition demonstrated
stronger forgetting than did participants in the unaided condition.
The experiments by Anderson and Green (2001) and Hertel and
Calcaterra (2005) demonstrated effects of deliberate thought suppression on later attempts to remember. It is important to note,
however, that these studies were conducted with nonclinical samples and with nonemotional material. Addressing this issue, recent
studies have begun to study intentional forgetting of emotional
material using this task (e.g., Depue, Banich, & Curran, 2006;
Depue, Curran, & Banich, 2007). Depue et al. (2006), for example,
paired neutral faces that served as cues with neutral and negative
words (Experiment 1) or with neutral and negative pictures (Experiment 2). In the final test phase, participants exhibited belowbaseline forgetting for both negative and neutral items in a recognition task. It is interesting that participants forgot significantly
more negative than neutral material in the no-think condition.
Hertel and Gerstle (2003) used a variant of Anderson and Green’s
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TNT paradigm to investigate forgetting of emotional material in
dysphoric and nondysphoric students. Participants learned to associate initially neutral nouns with positive or negative adjectives
that served as cues (e.g., gloomy cottage vs. splendid cottage;
slashed skin vs. smooth skin). During the learning phase, participants were instructed to form a self-referential mental image for
each pair. Hertel and Gerstle found that, on the final test of cued
recall, dysphoric students recalled more previously suppressed
nouns than did controls, regardless of the valence of the cue. To
further examine forgetting of emotional material in a diagnosed
sample, Joormann et al. (2005) employed the TNT paradigm with
clinically depressed participants. Participants learned to associate
neutral nouns with either positive or negative targets. In the suppression or TNT phase, participants were provided with multiple
occasions to suppress either positive or negative targets. In the
final recall test, depressed participants successfully forgot negative
targets and recalled fewer negative targets as more opportunities
for suppression had been provided.
These findings provide first evidence that training depressed
participants in intentional forgetting could prove to be an effective
strategy to counteract the consistently reported enhanced recall of
negative material in depression. The typical suppression training
during the TNT phase, however, does not provide participants with
any guidance of how to keep unwanted material from coming to
mind. Consequently, thought suppression in this task requires
considerable cognitive control. Hertel and Calcaterra (2005) demonstrated that intentional forgetting can be strengthened when
specific strategies are provided that help to constrain the focus of
attention during attempts to suppress in the TNT phase. Providing
such strategies may be particularly important when training intentional forgetting in depressed participants. Indeed, depression has
been found to be characterized by deficits in cognitive control and
in the initiation of strategies in otherwise unstructured tasks (see
Hertel, 2000). For example, in a series of studies, Hertel and
collaborators demonstrated that providing depressed participants
with specific instructions and strategies that focus attention on the
task at hand can alleviate depressive deficits in performance on
memory tasks. Therefore, we propose that depressed participants
will profit from receiving training in the use of specific strategies
that aid forgetting. In the current study, we investigated whether
forgetting in depressed participants can be strengthened through
training in the use of specific strategies for suppressing negative
material during the TNT phase.
In addition to comparing an aided and an unaided condition, we
also examined the effectiveness of different suppression strategies.
Previous research suggests that dysphoric participants often use
negative material to distract themselves from negative thoughts
and memories (Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988). Because of the
high accessibility of negative concepts in depression, the distracting material that is most available is likely to be negative (Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006). Wenzlaff et al. (1988) suggested, therefore,
that these attempts at distracting oneself from unwanted thoughts
and memories are likely to be counterproductive in depression. To
test this proposition in the present study, we compared the effectiveness of using positive and negative thought substitutes in the suppression training phase in fostering forgetting of negative material.
Given the proposed depression-associated deficit in cognitive
control, we predicted that depressed participants would profit
considerably from the use of cognitive strategies and, therefore,
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The procedure consisted of four different parts. During the
learning phase, participants were asked to memorize weakly related noun pairs, each consisting of an emotionally neutral cue and
a negative or positive target (e.g., mushroom-hostage; curtainhumor). Participants were required to reach the criterion of 50%
correctly recalled targets on subsequent learning tests to move on
to the TNT phase. In the TNT phase, cues were presented either 2
or 12 times, and participants practiced responding with positive
targets to cues presented in green font and suppressing negative
targets to cues presented in red font. Suppression was practiced
under one of three conditions: unaided suppression, suppression
aided by positive substitutes, or suppression aided by negative
substitutes. All substitutes were related to their corresponding cues
(e.g., mushroom-poison). Finally, in the recall phase, participants
were asked to recall all original targets associated with the cues,
regardless of whether they had practiced recalling or suppressing
them during training. In a second test of cued recall, we provided
the first letter of the target in addition to the cue to coax retrieval.
Participants in the substitute conditions were also asked to recall
the substitutes.

Five of the MDD participants were also diagnosed with dysthymia,
5 with anxiety disorders, and 2 with eating disorders. The nondepressed control group consisted of individuals with no current
diagnosis and no history of any Axis I disorder. Participants in the
depressed group were slightly but significantly older than participants in the nondepressed control group (depressed group, M ⫽
36.6, SD ⫽ 11.7; control group, M ⫽ 31.5, SD ⫽ 10.7), t(88) ⫽
2.2, p ⬍ .03, but did not differ in years of education completed
(depressed group, M ⫽ 15.0, SD ⫽ 3.5; control group, M ⫽ 14.9,
SD ⫽ 4.4), t(88) ⬍ 1, or proportion female (.69 and .78 in the
depressed and control groups, respectively), 2(1, N ⫽ 90) ⬍ 1.
Participants were randomly assigned to suppression conditions
(unaided, positive substitutes, or negative substitutes) and the three
materials conditions (used for counterbalancing; see below), subject to the constraint of equal cell sizes of 5. At the end of the
session, participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI–II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), a reliable and widely used
self-report measure of depressive symptoms. The BDI–II consists
of 21 items that assess the level of depressive symptoms present in
the past 2 weeks. The mean score on the BDI–II was 28.38 (SD ⫽
11.32) in the depressed group and 1.76 (SD ⫽ 1.96) in the control
group, t(88) ⫽ 15.54, p ⬍ .001. BDI–II scores did not differ as a
function of assigned suppression condition within either group
(within the depressed group, M ⫽ 29.9, SD ⫽ 13.40; M ⫽ 30.1,
SD ⫽ 8.63; and M ⫽ 25.2, SD ⫽ 11.52 for the unaided, positive
substitute, and negative substitute groups, respectively), F(2,
42) ⬍ 1, (within the control group, M ⫽ 2.4, SD ⫽ 2.02; M ⫽
1.4, SD ⫽ 1.88; and M ⫽ 1.5, SD ⫽ 1.92; for the unaided,
positive substitute, and negative substitute groups, respectively), F(2, 42) ⫽ 1.24, p ⬎ .05.

Participants and Design

Materials

Procedure for selection. Participants were recruited from advertisements posted on a frequently visited Internet page covering
the San Francisco, California, area. Respondents took part in a
phone interview, during which initial screening criteria were assessed (e.g., between 18 and 60 years old, no history of severe
head trauma, no learning disability, and no color blindness). Those
who were potentially eligible were invited to come into the laboratory and were administered the complete Structured Clinical
Interview for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (4th ed.; SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams,
1997) by a trained interviewer to assess current and lifetime
diagnosis.
A total of 75 currently depressed participants and 62 neverdepressed control participants took part in the learning phase. Of
those participants, 26 depressed and 17 controls did not meet the
criterion on the initial learning tests and did not continue. In
addition, we randomly excluded 4 depressed participants to maintain equal cell sizes.
Final sample and design. Our final sample consisted of 45
currently depressed participants and 45 controls. The depressed
group consisted of individuals who, at the time of testing, met
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.;
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for major depressive disorder (MDD) but not for psychotic symptoms, bipolar
disorder, and alcohol or substance abuse within the past 6 months.

Word pairs. Cues and targets were selected using the Affective Norms for English Words (Bradley & Lang, 1999). Nouns
with valence ratings below 4.0 were eligible for the negative
category, between 4.0 and 6.0 for the neutral category and above
6.0 for the positive category. Eighteen negative, 18 positive, and
36 neutral nouns were selected (mean valence ratings of 2.3, 7.7,
and 5.5, respectively). Word selection was also based on average
word length, frequency, and arousal. The final lists of negative and
positive words did not differ significantly in word length (negative
M ⫽ 5.9, SD ⫽ 1.4; neutral M ⫽ 5.6, SD ⫽ 1.5; positive M ⫽ 6.1,
SD ⫽ 1.7), word frequency (negative M ⫽ 13.7, SD ⫽ 20.8;
neutral M ⫽ 30.1, SD ⫽ 41.4; positive M ⫽ 20.2, SD ⫽ 20.7), or
arousal (negative M ⫽ 5.6, SD ⫽ 0.8; neutral M ⫽ 4.1, SD ⫽ 0.6;
positive M ⫽ 5.6, SD ⫽ 1.0), all ts(34) ⬍ 1. In addition, we used
the University of South Florida association norms to limit the
number of forward and backward associations within the positive
and negative lists and between the neutral and emotional word lists
(Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998).
Within each valence, the words were organized into sets containing six words each, and these sets were balanced on mean word
length, valence, arousal, and concreteness (all ps ⬎ .05). Each of
the six sets of neutral words was paired with a set of negative or
positive words. Within these paired sets, individual words were
paired by choosing those for which no reported forward or back-

would exhibit greater forgetting of negative material in the aided
than in the unaided conditions. In addition, following Wenzlaff et
al. (1988) and Dalgleish and Yiend (2006), we investigated
whether the use of positive substitute words would result in increased forgetting, whereas the use of negative substitute words
would be ineffective or even counterproductive.

Method
Overview

SPECIAL SECTION: TRAINING FORGETTING IN DEPRESSION

ward associations were found (on the basis of the University of
South Florida association norms; Nelson et al., 1998). The three
sets of positive word pairs and three sets of negative word pairs
were rotated systematically across the three-cue presentation (0, 2,
or 12) so that each pair would later appear in the baseline condition
for one third of the participants, as a target to be suppressed or
responded to twice by another third, and as a target to be suppressed or responded to 12 times for a final third. An additional 14
neutral words were selected from the same pool, with the same
criteria, and paired to serve as seven fillers in the learning and
training phases.
Substitute words (18 negative and 18 positive) were also selected using Affective Norms for English Words (Bradley & Lang,
1999) and the University of South Florida association norms
(Nelson et al., 1998) on the basis of the same affective rating
cutoffs (Ms ⫽ 6.5 and 2.1, respectively). In contrast with the
targets, substitutes were chosen to maximize the number of forward
and backward associations with their corresponding cues. We
selected thought substitutes on the basis of their a priori association with the cues to increase interference from the substitutes and
to quickly establish their connection with the cues during the TNT
phase.

Procedure
The procedure largely replicates Joormann et al. (2005). We
used Superlab Pro software (Version 2.04; Cedrus Corporation,
San Pedro, CA) to run all computer tasks; words were presented in
black 24-point font, centered on a white screen, unless otherwise
noted. Displays were separated by a blank screen for 500 ms. The
experimental session lasted 50 –120 min, and participants were
paid $25 per hour.
Learning phase. Forty-three word pairs appeared sequentially
for 5 s each. Seven of these were filler pairs, three of which were
presented at the beginning of the list, one in the middle, and three
at the end. All other word pairs appeared in a randomized block
order, with each block of six trials containing one pair from each
of the six sets. Participants were instructed to say the word pairs
aloud and try to remember them for a later test of attention.
After the participants viewed the complete list of word pairs
once, a feedback test was administered. When presented with each
cue word, participants attempted to recall the target aloud. Once
participants replied (or when 5,200 ms elapsed), the target appeared in blue for 2 s. Participants were instructed to use it to
reinforce their knowledge of the word pair. If fewer than half of the
word pairs were correctly recalled, an additional feedback test was
administered with differently ordered cue words. Participants were
given four chances to correctly recall at least half of the word pairs
before moving on to the TNT phase. Those who failed to reach the
criterion were asked to complete questionnaires and were thanked
for their participation.
Presentation of substitutes (for the substitute conditions only).
Participants saw a list of cues from the two sets destined for
suppression practice; each cue was followed by its related substitute. Neither cues nor substitutes were provided for the set of
negative pairs reserved for use in the baseline condition. Each new
pair appeared for 3 s. Having been told about the TNT phase,
participants were instructed to study and say the new word pairs
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aloud so that they could use the substitutes to help them suppress
targets in the next task.
TNT phase. We started participants with a short practice task
to familiarize them with the TNT procedure. In both the practice
task and the main TNT task, each trial started with a series of
crosses for 200 ms. Next, a cue appeared in either a green or a red
font for 3 s (or less if the participant responded sooner). When the
cue was green, participants were instructed to respond with the
target, just as they had done in the learning phase. (The blue
feedback target was displayed for 500 ms in the main TNT phase,
only when participants responded incorrectly; during practice trials, it was presented regardless of the participants’ response.)
When the cue was red, participants were instructed to focus on and
comprehend the cue word but to avoid saying or thinking about the
associated target. Those who had learned a substitute were asked
to think about and reply with the substitute word instead. If
participants mistakenly responded with the original target, a series
of very large red Xs was displayed for 500 ms. For participants
who had learned a substitute, the same series of red Xs was
displayed if they responded with an incorrect substitute word or
not at all. Regardless of participants’ accuracy in recalling the
substitute, it appeared in blue font for 500 ms at the end of every
suppression trial.
During the practice task, six filler cue words appeared in green
once or twice each and one filler cue word appeared in red eight
times. Participants in the substitute conditions were given a substitute to practice thinking about when red cues appeared. At the
end of the practice task, participants completed a short form to
ensure that they understood and complied with the instructions.
The main task consisted of 244 trials. Six green cues for positive
targets and six red cues for negative targets were each presented
twice; similarly, six cues for positive and six for negative targets
were each presented 12 times. In addition, six green cues for
neutral filler targets were presented 12 times; two filler cues
occurred at the beginning and two at the end of the list. The first
presentation of the twice-presented cue words occurred in the first
half of the trials. All cue words that were to be presented 12 times
were displayed before the next random iteration began.
Final recall tests. The final recall phase had three components. In the cued recall task, each cue appeared for 4 s, or less if
the participant responded sooner. Participants were instructed to
recall and say aloud all original targets in response to the presented
cues, regardless of whether they had suppressed or responded with
them in the training phase. Four filler words were followed by six
randomized blocks of one cue from each of the six sets. Cues
appeared in a randomized block order that was the same for all
participants; each block contained a cue from each of the six sets
of pairs. If the substitute word was also remembered, participants
were instructed to say that word aloud and, if possible, specify
which was the substitute and which the original response. After the
cued recall task, the same test occurred a second time but with cues
that were followed by the first letter of the original target (stemcued recall). Participants were told to use the letter to help them
recall the target. Finally, participants in the substitute conditions
were given a sheet of paper that listed all cue words that had been
paired with positive or negative substitutes and were asked to write
down the substitute words.

JOORMANN, HERTEL, LEMOULT, AND GOTLIB
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Results

Cued Recall
Our predictions concerned the percentage of targets recalled on
the first test following the TNT phase. The first ANOVA conducted on this measure included within-subjects factors for instruction (respond with positive, suppress negative targets) and the
number of cue presentations (0, 2, 12) during the suppression
training phase. First, as is always the case in TNT experiments, the
interaction of instruction (respond, suppress) with the number of
cue presentations (0, 2, 12) was significant, F(2, 144) ⫽ 78.10,
MSE ⫽ 218.61, p ⬍ .001, 2p ⫽ .52. Thus, the number of words
that participants recalled in the respond versus suppress conditions
depended on the number of times the cue words were presented.
Second, the effect of instruction depended on the suppression
conditions (unaided, positive substitutes, negative substitutes),
F(2, 72) ⫽ 8.43, MSE ⫽ 376.02, p ⫽ .001, 2p ⫽ .19. Third, the
three-way interaction of group, suppression condition, and the
number of cue presentations was significant, F(4, 144) ⫽ 4.34,
MSE ⫽ 191.87, p ⫽ .002, 2p ⫽ .11. To understand these interactions and to evaluate specific predictions, we conducted further
analyses separately within the respond and suppress conditions.
In the respond condition, recall of positively valenced targets
depended significantly on how many times their cues were presented during the TNT phase, F(2, 144) ⫽ 80.78, MSE ⫽ 148.40,
p ⬍ .001, 2p ⫽ .53 (Ms ⫽ 76, 91, and 99 for 0, 2, and 12
presentations, respectively). In addition, MDD participants recalled fewer positive targets than did controls (M ⫽ 86 vs. 90), but
the difference was only marginally significant, F(1, 72) ⫽ 3.78,
MSE ⫽ 278.80, p ⫽ .056, 2p ⫽ .05.
Our predictions all pertained to the percentage of recalled targets following training in the suppression of negative words. In
this analysis, we used the linear trend across the number of cue
presentations (0, 2, 12) as the within-subjects factor to evaluate
below-baseline forgetting. The three-way interaction of group,
suppression condition, and this linear trend was significant, F(2,
72) ⫽ 4.76, MSE ⫽ 266.97, p ⫽ .011, 2p ⫽ .12.1 Figure 1 depicts
the means for the control group, and Figure 2 depicts the means for
the MDD group. Follow-up tests were conducted within each
group.

suppress unaided
positive subs
negative subs

90

mean % recalled

Each recall measure was submitted to an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with between-subjects factors for group (MDD, control) and suppression condition (unaided, positive substitutes, negative substitutes). Most analyses also included within-subject factors for the number of cue presentations (0, 2, 12) and instruction
(respond, suppress) during the TNT phase. Some of the cue members of the originally learned pairs (the cues in the 0 condition)
were never presented during the TNT phase. The recall of these
targets on the final test served as the baseline condition. We also
included a between-subjects factor for the materials condition (3
levels) in each analysis to reduce error variance; we do not report
effects involving that factor. The dependent variables were the
percentages of recalled targets (from a total of six items per
condition). The significance level was set at .05. We do not report
significant effects that were qualified by higher order interactions.
Other unreported effects in the overall designs were all nonsignificant; for these effects, the lowest p value was .10.

100

80
70
60
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40
30

0

2

12

cue presentations [control]
Figure 1. Mean percentage of targets recalled by the control participants
after suppression training as a function of condition (suppress unaided,
positive subs, and negative subs) and number of cue presentations. Subs ⫽
substitutes. Error bars ⫽ 1 SE.

As seen in Figure 1, forgetting in the control group depended
upon the condition for suppression, F(2, 36) ⫽ 6.62, MSE ⫽
784.96, p ⫽ .004, 2p ⫽ .27. Tukey’s honestly significant difference revealed that control participants who were trained to use
positive substitutes recalled fewer targets than did participants in
the other conditions, which did not differ significantly. Across
conditions, control participants showed evidence of belowbaseline forgetting, F(1, 36) ⫽ 27.62, MSE ⫽ 279.33, p ⬍ .001,
2p ⫽ .43. Within conditions, control participants exhibited belowbaseline forgetting in the unaided condition, F(1, 12) ⫽ 12.50,
MSE ⫽ 2083.00, p ⬍ .01, 2p ⫽ .51, and in the positive substitutes
condition, F(1, 12) ⫽ 48.28, MSE ⫽ 6258.87, p ⬍ .001, 2p ⫽ .80.
In the negative substitutes condition, a significant quadratic trend
was obtained, F(1, 12) ⫽ 4.84, MSE ⫽ 750.10, p ⬍ .001, 2p ⫽ .29.
As seen in Figure 1, recall differed significantly only between the
condition in which the cue was presented twice and the condition
in which the cue was presented 12 times, t(14) ⫽ 2.26, p ⬍ .05.
Thus, control participants exhibited training effects in the forgetting of negative targets in the unaided and the aided conditions.
Training in the use of positive thought substitutes, however,
further aided forgetting of negative targets in this group.
As seen in Figure 2, the interaction of suppression condition
(unaided, positive substitutes, negative substitutes) with the linear
trend across the number of cue presentations was significant for
MDD participants, F(2, 36) ⫽ 8.23, MSE ⫽ 254.62, p ⫽ .001, 2p ⫽
.31. Follow-up tests examined means within each suppression condition. MDD participants showed no evidence of below-baseline forgetting in the unaided condition, F(1, 12) ⫽ 1.14, p ⬎ .05, but
exhibited below-baseline forgetting when using both positive substitutes, F(1, 12) ⫽ 15.36, MSE ⫽ 3342.87, p ⫽ .02, 2p ⫽ .56, and
1
These results did not change when age of the participants or number of
correctly recalled words on the final learning trial were included as
covariates.
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Stem-Cued Recall

100
suppress unaided
positive subs
negative subs

mean % recalled
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Figure 2. Mean percentage of targets recalled by the depressed participants after suppression training as a function of condition (suppress unaided, positive subs, and negative subs) and number of cue presentations.
Subs ⫽ substitutes; MDD ⫽ major depressive disorder. Error bars ⫽ 1 SE.

negative substitutes, F(1, 12) ⫽ 16.04, MSE ⫽ 4083.41, p ⬍ .01,
2p ⫽ .57. Thus, in this group, below-baseline forgetting occurred
only when substitutes were provided. Forgetting did not depend on
the valence of the substitutes.
We also examined differences involving groups within each
suppression condition. A significant interaction of group and cue
presentation emerged only in the unaided condition, F(1, 24) ⫽
8.91, MSE ⫽ 2041.67, p ⫽ .006, 2p ⫽ .27. In both the positive and
negative substitute conditions, main effects in linear trends of cue
presentation were the only significant findings; for positive substitutes, F(1, 24) ⫽ 53.99, MSE ⫽ 9375.00, p ⬍ .001, 2p ⫽ .69;
for negative substitutes, F(1, 24) ⫽ 10.47, MSE ⫽ 4166.88, p ⫽
.004, 2p ⫽ .30. Thus, group differences in below-baseline forgetting were obtained only in the unaided conditions.

To evaluate the robustness of the forgetting of negative targets
after suppression training, we conducted a second recall test by an
additional cue in the form of the first letter of the target word (see
Table 1). Our intent was to coax retrieval of the negative targets.
The analysis of these results, restricted to negative targets, revealed the same pattern of results as that obtained in the first test.
The three-way interaction of group, suppression condition, and the
linear trend across the number of cue presentations was significant,
F(2, 72) ⫽ 3.35, MSE ⫽ 287.81, p ⫽ .041, 2p ⫽ .08. Follow-up
tests yielded results similar to those obtained on the first recall test.
Control participants exhibited below-baseline forgetting in the unaided condition, F(1, 12) ⫽ 6.40, MSE ⫽ 1333.20, p ⫽ .026, 2p ⫽
.35, and when they used positive substitutes, F(1, 12) ⫽ 32.06,
MSE ⫽ 4898.57, p ⬍ .001, 2p ⫽ .73, but not when they used
negative substitutes, F(1, 12) ⬍ 1. For the MDD group, no belowbaseline forgetting was found in the unaided condition, F(1, 12) ⬍
1. In both the positive and the negative substitutes conditions,
however, significant below-baseline forgetting emerged, F(1,
12) ⫽ 7.92, MSE ⫽ 2676.24, p ⫽ .016, 2p ⫽ .40, for positive
substitutes; F(1, 12) ⫽ 8.03, MSE ⫽ 2675.80, p ⫽ .015, 2p ⫽ .40,
for negative substitutes.
In a further analysis, we compared performance across the two
types of recall tests by including a within-subjects factor for test
(first vs. second). The only significant outcome involving this test
factor was its main effect, F(1, 72) ⫽ 61.13, MSE ⫽ 125.24, p ⬍
.001, 2p ⫽ .46. On average, 59% of targets were recalled on the
first test and 66% on the stem-cued test.

Substitutes
The third test asked participants to recall each substitute when
presented with the appropriate cue. An ANOVA was conducted
with a within-subjects factor for the number of cue presentations
during the TNT phase (2 or 12). The only significant effect in the
overall design was the main effect of the number of cue presentations, F(1, 48) ⫽ 21.01, MSE ⫽ 185.18, p ⬍ .001, 2p ⫽ .30.
Participants recalled an average of 80% of substitutes used twice
and 91% of substitutes used 12 times.

Table 1
Mean Percentage (and Standard Deviations) of Targets Recalled in the Stem-Cued Recall Task
After Suppression Training
Control group
Condition
Respond
0
2
12
Suppress
0
2
12

MDD group

Unaided

Pos subs

Neg subs

Unaided

Pos subs

Neg subs

84.44 (16.01)
98.88 (4.30)
100

78.88 (18.32)
87.77 (16.02)
96.67 (9.34)

85.55 (13.89)
96.66 (6.90)
96.67 (6.90)

75.56 (21.70)
93.33 (8.45)
97.78 (5.87)

76.66 (18.69)
91.11 (12.38)
93.33 (10.54)

79.99 (20.11)
91.11 (18.76)
100

84.44 (17.21)
73.33 (16.43)
71.11 (14.73)

72.22 (20.58)
55.56 (22.41)
46.66 (26.13)

71.11 (20.38)
70.00 (20.11)
67.78 (20.38)

68.88 (19.79)
72.22 (14.99)
71.11 (23.96)

73.33 (18.69)
55.56 (27.93)
54.44 (23.96)

72.22 (23.28)
58.89 (22.60)
53.34 (21.08)

Note. N ⫽ 90; Respond ⫽ participants were asked to respond with the target during suppression training.
Suppress ⫽ participants were asked to suppress the target during suppression training. 0 ⫽ baseline, 2 ⫽ two
cue presentations, 12 ⫽ 12 cue presentations. Unaided ⫽ suppress unaided; pos subs ⫽ positive substitutes, neg
subs ⫽ negative substitutes.
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Discussion

Depression is characterized by the frequent occurrence of unintentional and often uncontrollable negative thoughts and memories. Although we are gaining a better understanding of the role
that these biases play in maintaining depression, we know little
about effective methods to ameliorate them. In this study, we
examined whether we could train depressed individuals to forget
negative material. We explicitly instructed depressed and nondepressed participants not to think about negative target words that
they had learned to associate with a neutral cue word, and we gave
them multiple occasions to practice suppression. We further compared an unaided suppression condition with two conditions in
which we provided participants with specific cognitive strategies
to aid forgetting: the use of positive and negative thought substitutes. We predicted that, given depression-associated deficits in
cognitive control, training in the use of a specific strategy, such as
the use of positive or negative substitutes, would aid forgetting by
depressed participants. The results support our main prediction.
Depressed participants benefited considerably from being provided with a strategy for forgetting negative material. Whereas
only control participants exhibited below-baseline forgetting in the
unaided condition, both depressed and control participants exhibited this effect when using substitutes. We also found that positive
and negative substitutes were differentially effective in aiding
forgetting, but only for the nondepressed participants, who could
use only positive substitutes to further increase forgetting. In
contrast, depressed participants did not differ in their forgetting of
negative stimuli when using positive or negative substitutes. Finally, the forgetting of negative material was robust; the results
remained stable even when recall was aided by the presentation of
the first letter of the target in a second memory task.
In a previous study using the TNT design, we demonstrated that
depressed participants profit from repeated occasions of practicing
suppressing negative material and exhibit increased forgetting of
negative words following suppression training (Joormann et al.,
2005). In the present study, we extended these findings by demonstrating that training depressed participants in the use of specific
strategies further aids forgetting. These studies, therefore, provide
first evidence for the impact of cognitive training on biased processing of negative material in depression. Previous research
has demonstrated that training allocation of attention away from
emotional material and training the interpretation of ambiguous
material toward benign interpretations in student samples or in
participants scoring high on anxiety measures results in reduced
post-training state anxiety and reduced reactivity when participants
are exposed to a laboratory stressor. In one of the first studies to
use this approach, MacLeod et al. (2002) experimentally induced
differential attentional responses to emotional stimuli in college
students and found that, compared with participants who were
trained to focus on negative material, participants who were
trained to avoid negative stimuli demonstrated a reduced tendency
to respond to a subsequent stress task with increases in negative
mood ratings. Similarly, Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) trained
participants to interpret ambiguous information in a benign or
threatening manner and found that training reduced both negative
interpretation biases to novel stimuli and post-training state anxiety scores. Similar results have been reported in a number of
follow-up studies, all conducted under the umbrella of cognitive-

bias modification (Hirsch, Mathews, & Clark, 2007; Wilson,
MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006; Yiend, Mackintosh, &
Mathews, 2005).
Modifications of cognitive biases in attention and interpretation
are more relevant to our understanding of anxiety disorders than to
our understanding of depression. In contrast with anxiety disorders, depression is characterized primarily by sustained processing
and increased elaboration of negative material, which result in
biased memory (for a review, see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005).
Consequently, cognitive-bias modification paradigms that focus
on reducing biases in interpretation and attention are less likely to
be effective in depression. In contrast, training intentional forgetting of negative material targets a cognitive bias that has been
consistently linked to depression (Matt et al., 1992). Our findings
suggest that depressed participants can learn to forget negative
material if we instruct them to suppress previously learned negative material, provide them with multiple occasions to practice
suppression, and provide them with strategies that constrain their
attention and thereby aid suppression. Indeed, we found transfer of
our suppression training to participants’ performance on a memory
task. In this study, we did not assess whether this training also
reduced negative affect or stress reactivity in the depressed participants. In this regard, it is unclear whether the stress-reactivity
tasks (e.g., unsolvable anagrams) that have been used in previous
training studies in anxiety would be useful in depression (see
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Nevertheless, the demonstration in
this study of an effect of training on biased processing in depression is an important first step in evaluating cognitive training in
this disorder. Future studies are required to examine the important
question of whether suppression training also affects other aspects
of depressive disorders. Recent studies that have focused on training depressed and dysphoric participants to recall more specific
and less overgeneral autobiographic memories have reported that
this training affects emotional vulnerability (e.g., Moberly &
Watkins, 2006; Philippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, 2003; Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2006).
Our findings further elucidate when and why intentional forgetting is observed in Anderson and Green’s (2001) TNT design. Our
results are consistent with Hertel and Calcaterra’s (2005) finding
that forgetting of nonemotional material in this task is strengthened
by the use of thought substitutes. In the traditional TNT phase,
participants are instructed merely to avoid thinking about the target
word when they see the red cue, without further instructions about
how suppression might be achieved. The lack of guidance in the
suppression phase leaves room for individual differences in the use
of self-initiated strategies (as also suggested by Bulevich et al.,
2006). Indeed, in a previous study in which we used this design to
investigate forgetting of emotional material in depression, we
found below-baseline forgetting of negative material in the depressed participants, even though we provided no strategy for the
suppression training phase (Joormann et al., 2005). These participants, however, reported frequent use of thought substitutes in a
questionnaire they were given after the final recall task. The use of
thought substitution introduces retroactive interference and is similar to retrieval-induced forgetting, in which rehearsal of items that
are closely related to a category cue prevents later recall of other
previously learned items in the same category (Anderson & Spellman, 1995). In contrast with the original targets, the substitute
words used in the present study were selected so that they were a
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priori associated with the cue words. In retrieval-induced forgetting, practicing material that competes with unpracticed memories
leads to reduced recall of the unpracticed words (Anderson &
Spellman, 1995). The increased forgetting of negative material
when using thought substitutes in the present study might be due
to a similar mechanism.
The to-be-suppressed targets in the TNT phase are similar to
unwanted thoughts. Research examining the intentional suppression of unwanted thoughts has been guided by the notion of ironic
control processes, which predicts that attempts to push away or
suppress an unwanted thought increase its accessibility, particularly under high cognitive load (Wegner, 1994). There are a
number of differences, however, between typical thoughtsuppression tasks and the TNT design. For example, whereas
participants in thought-suppression studies are usually presented
with the to-be-suppressed item once, participants in the TNT study
are provided with multiple occasions to suppress. In addition,
whereas the dependent variable in thought suppression tasks is
usually the level of success of thought suppression as indexed by
the number of intrusions, the dependent measure in the TNT task
is subsequent recall of the to-be-suppressed items. In fact, investigators explicitly examining recall have found suppression to lead
to poorer memory for the suppressed stimuli (Rassin, 2001; Wegner, Quillian, & Houston, 1996). Still, thinking of something else
when confronted with the cue might be a particularly powerful
strategy that aids thought suppression and counteracts the ironic
processes that are seen in other thought-suppression designs. Wegner, Schneider, Carter, and White (1987), for example, reported
that participants who were given a specific alternative thought
(e.g., a red Volkswagen) to use as a distractor during thoughtsuppression trials reported fewer intrusions. Similarly, Salkovskis
and Campbell (1994) demonstrated that thought suppression was
successful after an interval of engagement in a different task.
Distraction has been found in a number of studies to curtail
rumination, reduce recall biases, and repair negative mood states in
depressed participants (Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Joormann,
Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007; Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). Thus, an
important difference between depressed and nondepressed participants may involve their ability to constrain attention in unstructured tasks like the TNT phase and to initiate the use of effective
strategies like distraction or thought substitution (see Hertel,
2004).
Another interesting finding of this study concerns the differential effectiveness of positive and negative thought substitutes.
Whereas both the depressed and nondepressed participants profited from using positive thought substitutes, depressed participants
exhibited greater forgetting of negative material than did nondepressed controls when using negative thought substitutes. This
pattern of findings suggests that using positive thought substitutes
is a powerful strategy that aids forgetting of negative material in
everyone; the effectiveness of using negative thought substitutes to
aid forgetting of negative stimuli in depressed individuals, however, is intriguing. Wenzlaff et al. (1988) found that depressed
participants are likely to distract themselves with other negatively
valenced material when trying to suppress negative thoughts but
also noted that this might be an ineffective strategy. Specifically,
although negative cues might lead to effective thought suppression, the use of these cues might not be effective in changing mood
states or might even exacerbate negative affect. Similarly, Dozois
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and Dobson (2001) suggested that because negative information in
depression is densely interrelated, the distracting information that
is most available is negative. Indeed, Dalgleish and Yiend (2006)
reported that the attempts by depressed individuals to suppress
memories led to speeded access to other negative, but not positive,
material on a subsequent cued recall task. These investigators
further suggested that the use of negative distractors is likely
maladaptive in terms of breaking patterns of negative thinking.
The results of the current study, however, suggest that negative
and positive distracting thoughts can aid forgetting of negative
material in depression. These findings suggest that distraction is a
powerful tool that aids thought suppression and intentional forgetting in depression, independent of the content of the distracting
thoughts. Given the increased accessibility of negative material in
depressed individuals, negative thought substitutes may create
increased interference, which leads to increased forgetting. Investigators might profitably examine this proposed mechanism more
explicitly in future research.
Clearly, these findings represent only a first step in research on
cognitive bias training in depression, and they have several limitations. For example, we did not assess the long-term effects of our
training, nor did we investigate whether our training affects other
depressive symptoms, like stress vulnerability or mood ratings.
Similarly, we did not investigate whether forgetting generalizes to
other memory tests, and we investigated forgetting of only negative material; future research should examine whether depressed
and nondepressed people differ in their intentional forgetting of
positive and neutral information. Our results demonstrate that the
use of thought substitutes improves forgetting of negative material
in depressed participants. It is noteworthy that exposing MDD
participants to 12 opportunities to practice the use of thought
substitutes did not enhance forgetting in this group beyond that
observed with 2 practice opportunities. It is possible, therefore,
that the initial learning of thought substitutes is sufficient for
below-baseline forgetting to occur and that repeated exposure to
the suppress cues and repeated use of the thought substitutes do not
enhance this forgetting. That is, because the baseline cannot include either substitutes or TNT training, it is difficult to determine
whether participants must go through the TNT training to increase
forgetting or whether it is sufficient to provide them with a thought
substitute. Future research might distinguish more explicitly between these two possibilities and increase our understanding of the
mechanisms that underlie the forgetting effects observed in our
study.
In addition, because we did not include a test of recall using
independent cues, we cannot in this study examine the underlying
mechanisms of increased intentional forgetting. Thus, it is unclear
whether our training established cognitive inhibition of the to-beforgotten material or whether forgetting was entirely due to the
interference created by alternative thoughts. As Anderson and
Levy (2007) have pointed out, independent cues are required to
isolate inhibition as the cause of forgetting. The main goal of this
study, however, was to demonstrate that the use of a strategy can
increase forgetting, and future research is needed to examine the
underlying mechanisms of this effect.
These limitations also preclude strong statements about the
potential effectiveness of our training for clinical intervention.
Future studies should investigate whether the present results generalize to the personal information that plays a role in the main-

JOORMANN, HERTEL, LEMOULT, AND GOTLIB

42

tenance of depression. Although the present findings are encouraging, it is important to be cautious in drawing clinical
implications from the results of experimental studies (e.g.,
Holmes, Moulds, & Kavanagh, 2007). The present results suggest
that forgetting of negative material in depression can be achieved.
The question of whether suppressing emotional material is beneficial or detrimental in the treatment of depression or of other
disorders like post-traumatic stress disorder was not addressed
explicitly in our experiment (see Reynolds & Brewin, 1999, for an
interesting essay about this debate).
In closing, our findings suggest that training depressed participants to suppress negative material and, most important, providing
them with a strategy for how to suppress increases intentional
forgetting of negative material. Thus, training depressed individuals in intentional forgetting could prove to be an effective strategy
to counteract ruminative tendencies and the consequent sustained
processing of negative material. Similarly, Brewin (2006) suggested that CBT may work not by directly modifying negative
information in memory but, instead, by producing changes in the
relative accessibility of positive and negative representations such
that positive memories involving the self win the retrieval competition over negative memories. Given that the intentional forgetting of negative material plays an important role in emotion
regulation, this and other forms of cognitive training that have the
potential to increase individuals’ cognitive control may represent
important methods of remediation.
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